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5.1  Introduction 
Large commercial aircraft production is one of the areas in which the United 
States accuses European governments of unfair trade practices. Airbus Indus- 
trie is undoubtedly heavily supported by subsidies from all participating coun- 
tries. From 1970 up to today, at least $11-$12  billion (U.S.) has been paid by 
European governments-some  American estimates of that support come to as 
much as $20 billion (U.S.)-and  the development of the A330/340 will require 
several billion dollars more in the next few years. The cause for these payments 
was the decision of  European  governments in the late  1960s to support the 
entry of a European competitor in the market for large transport aircraft. 
Up to now these subsidies have been predominantly paid to finance start-up 
investments  of  the  now-existing  and  planned  fleet  of  aircraft-the  A300, 
A310,  A320,  A330,  A340,  most  likely  the  A321,  and  possibly  a  military 
freighter. This situation might change in the future, because the German gov- 
ernment has agreed to grant production subsidies under specific circumstances. 
By the end of 1989 Daimler-Benz had merged with MBB, the German partners 
of Airbus Industrie, and a precondition of Daimler-Benz’s acquiring the risky 
commercial aircraft business was a long-term exchange rate guarantee from 
the German government. Since aircraft are sold in U.S. dollars worldwide, this 
could amount to a sizable production subsidy if the DM/dollar exchange rate 
stays below  1.80 for a considerable time, e.g., in  1990 some 240 million DM 
will be paid to German Airbus. 
This government-supported market entry and the exchange rate guarantees 
make it an interesting goal to analyze the strategic trade policy issue of Euro- 
pean government intervention.  One aspect of this competition between Euro- 
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pean and American producers was examined by Baldwin and Krugman (1 988), 
who developed a simulation model for the entry of the Airbus A300 in the 
market for medium- to long-range wide-bodied jet aircraft. The A300 was the 
first aircraft to  be launched by  Airbus, and it entered a market  segment-a 
“window,” as it is called in the industry-which  had appeared in the 1970s due 
to the strong expansion of air traffic. At that time, Airbus was in an ambiguous 
situation: it was a new entrant to the overall market for large transport aircraft 
competing with well-established firms, but it was the first to enter the market 
segment for which the A300 was designed, whereas deliveries of Boeing’s new 
767 started six years later. 
Baldwin and Krugman explained this situation of being a first-mover and at 
the same time having little chance to make profits on the A300 by  cost differ- 
ences between Airbus and Boeing-that  is, Airbus had an approximately  17 
percent higher unit cost at the same scale of production (1988,25). This appar- 
ent cost disadvantage has been attributed by company officials to accumulated 
learning effects in the production of other aircraft types. They claim that such 
economies of scope account for Airbus’s lack of success, hence the decision to 
develop the A320132  I  and A3301340 in order to supply a complete family of 
aircraft. One purpose of this paper is to look at the effects of the market entry 
of Airbus by taking into account the complete family of aircraft. 
The simulation model of Baldwin and Krugman uses government support 
that essentially supports the fixed costs of start-up investments and thus enables 
the firm to accept a lower than average profitability or even losses. Direct pro- 
duction subsidies, which have been minor in the past, seem to have become 
more important with the devaluation of the dollar. If the dollar stays at the fall 
I990 level there will be substantial subsidies to be paid, at least by the German 
government. The comparative advantage of the American civil aircraft industry 
will  deteriorate,  and political  pressures  on the U.S. government to retaliate 
against such policies will increase. The already ongoing dispute about aircraft 
subsidies will most likely intensify. How such European subsidization of sales 
and potential  American  retaliation  might  affect  competition  among aircraft 
producers  as well as welfare  in the different  regions  is another topic to be 
looked at in this paper. 
This paper uses the conceptual  ideas of  Spence (1981) and Baldwin  and 
Krugman  (1 988) to model the long-term  impact of dynamic learning effects 
on competition. The same approach has also been used by Baldwin and Flam 
(1989) in a simulation study of the commuter aircraft market. The present ef- 
fort deviates in its calibration  philosophy. Commonly, producer  cost differ- 
ences are calibrated according to market shares: a producer with a large market 
share is presumed  to have lower costs. The source of  such cost differences 
remains unexplained. In this paper, it is assumed that technical know-how is 
available equally to all producers and that factor prices do not deviate greatly 
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market shares and those which are expected for the coming years be reasonably 
explained without factor price or technological differences? 
We show that this is possible by accounting for different times of market 
entry in the three market segments by two producers:  a newcomer and an in- 
cumbent. Yet, if the model is calibrated to such a situation, the claim of Airbus 
officials that Airbus will become profitable as soon as it can supply a complete 
family of aircraft can not be supported by the simulations. 
The paper starts with a short introduction to the specific features of the mar- 
ket for transport aircraft. It is followed by the presentation of the calibration 
model and a discussion of the calibration procedure. The welfare effects of 
Airbus market entry are assessed by comparing the existing duopoly to a po- 
tential American monopoly and to a potential American  duopoly. Then the 
allocation and welfare effects of an ad valorem subsidy to Airbus are simu- 
lated. Finally, the impact of potential retaliation by the American administra- 
tion on competition among European and American producers is analyzed. 
5.2  Industry Characteristics 
Today  there  are three large producers  of  large transport  aircraft:  Boeing 
(over 50 percent market share), Airbus (30-35  percent), and McDonnell Doug- 
las (10-15  percent).  Other civil aircraft forms a relatively  minor part of  the 
industry in terms of value. In the United States, large transport aircraft covers 
about 70 percent of all civil aircraft industry shipments. Light transport air- 
craft, helicopters, business aircraft, and other aircraft account for the rest (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1986). The three large producers are embedded in 
a network of subcontractors that supply aircraft parts. Most important, the en- 
gines, amounting to 20-30  percent of the value of  an aircraft, are developed 
by outside companies. Avionics, systems, and components (brakes, tires, etc.) 
are often subcontracted as well. 
The market is small in terms of number of aircraft sold, but each aircraft is 
an expensive product.  Every year, 400 to 500 large transport aircraft are ex- 
pected to be sold, allowing for some yearly fluctuation. Aircraft prices range 
from $25 to $30 million for a Boeing 737, to $30 to $32 million for an A320, 
to around $120 million for a Boeing 747. The relatively small number of air- 
craft sold goes hand in hand with a long product cycle: it takes five to six years 
from launch to first delivery. Then an aircraft has a product cycle of  at least 
20-25  years, during which it may be upgraded to new technological standards. 
Large transport aircraft have a complex production technology that results 
in strong learning effects. An essential part of learning appears in the assembly 
of  an aircraft,  which requires craftsmanship and the careful timing of  thou- 
sands of activities. Such experience is embodied in the work force and accumu- 
lates with the number of aircraft that have been produced. There is worldwide 
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production costs decrease by 20 percent with a doubling of output (Berg and 
Tielke-Hosemann 1987; U.S. Department of Commerce 1986; see fig. 5A.  1 in 
the appendix for some empirical examples). Whereas start-up investments and 
R&D are costly in absolute terms, the economies of  scale are dominated by 
learning effects which amount to 90 percent of the overall economies of scale. 
Some production stages are not specific to a particular type of aircraft, so that 
learning effects which are realized in the production of a generic aircraft can 
influence the marginal cost of producing another generic aircraft. Such cross- 
effects are strong for updated versions of an aircraft, the so-called derivatives. 
These effects can be captured by  economies of scope. Industry characteristics 
can then be summarized as (i) static economies of  scale (R&D and start-up 
investment),  (ii) dynamic  economies  of  scale (learning in production),  and 
(iii) economies of scope (cross-effects of learning). 
5.2.1  Competition 
Aircraft producers compete in essentially two ways. There is first the long- 
run decision about product choice and capacity. The demand in each segment 
even over a long time horizon is small in terms of the number of aircraft: 3,000 
to 4,000 units each in the short- and medium-range markets and around 2,000 
units in the long-range market are the expected market sizes over the next 20 
years. Since learning effects are embodied in the work force, capacity choice 
becomes the crucial long-run decision variable. 
There is, of course, limited information about future demand. Market fore- 
casts by  the  large producers  over the  next 20 years, however, do not differ 
greatly, suggesting that the game is played under identical expectations. Figure 
5.1 illustrates the different types of  aircraft that are currently  offered by  the 
three producers, according to range and seating capacity. In each of the market 
segments-short-range  narrow-bodied,  short-  and  medium-range  wide- 
bodied, and long-range aircraft-Airbus  and Boeing offer competing generic 
aircraft, with possible derivatives. 
Once capacity is determined,  aircraft producers have limited choice over 
short-run output levels. They essentially produce at full capacity; that is, their 
time profile of deliveries is determined. A decision to increase capacity is then 
comparable to a new start on the learning curve.' The producers then bargain 
with airlines in their day-to-day marketing activities over the price of aircraft. 
Airlines seem to make extensive use of repeated negotiations with the suppliers 
of an aircraft for a specific market segment. Competition takes the form of a 
price game at given capacity levels, where the outcome of the long-run quantity 
game then becomes a restriction in the short-run price game. If demand turns 
out to be larger than expected, firms will produce at their capacity limit and 
choose  prices  which  maximize  profits.  For unexpectedly  low  demand,  the 
1. This is supported by the evidence about capacity expansions in Boeing's production plants, 
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price game may  drive prices down to marginal cost levels. In extreme cases, 
“white tails” are produced; that is, aircraft are produced without a customer 
in sight. 
5.2.2  Market Entry 
Entry in a market such as the one for large transport aircraft is an expensive 
and time-consuming  effort. Dynamic and static economies of  scale together 
with economies of scope give incumbent firms a considerable competitive ad- 
vantage. It is therefore not surprising that the market entry of Airbus was ac- 
companied by the heavy involvement of European governments. After several 
commercially  unsuccessful  projects,  European  aircraft  producers  were  not 
willing to take yet another gamble. 
When in the 1960s European aerospace firms were considering entering the 
market for large transport with a new generation of aircraft, this market was 
almost  completely  dominated  by  the  three  American  producers-Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas,  and Lockheed.  Previously  produced European  aircraft 
had  not  been  successful  commercially,  and  the  belief  was  that  no  non- 
American producer could compete in size with the three firms. In this situation, 
market entry can be viewed as the first stage of a three-stage decision process. 
First, commitment by European governments to subsidize the launch of a new 
aircraft was necessary  since, apparently, financing on capital markets without 
state support was not possible. Second, firms had to decide which market seg- 
ment to enter, and they had to choose a capacity which would allow them to 
capture the learning effects of large-scale production and at the same time keep 
prices at a profitable level. Finally, once the first two decisions  were made, 
firms had to compete with the other producers in the day-to-day business of 
selling their product. 
The first decision must be made under great uncertainty, and not only eco- 
nomic but also political  arguments govern this process. Industrial policy as- 
pects  such  as civil-military  interaction  in  the  aerospace  industry  were  im- 
portant. From the perspective of  European firms, government support turned 
out to be essential. Not only is the financial burden for the launch of a com- 
pletely new aircraft high, but the commitment by governments to support mar- 
ket entry could also prevent incumbent firms from starting a price war in the 
hope of  stripping the entrant of  its financial resources (Brander and Spencer 
1983). When the Bonner Protokoll of  September  1967 gave British, French, 
and German governmental support to the launch of the A300 (Berg and Tielke- 
Hosemann 1987, 1988), the first-stage was considered finished. 
Once the A300 came to the market in  1974, airlines were not enthusiastic 
about buying a new aircraft from a new producer. Parts, maintenance, training, 
etc., did not  fit the products  of  Boeing, Lockheed,  or McDonnell Douglas. 
Although  the  A300 was designed to close the  window  for a high-capacity 
short- to medium-range transport aircraft and this window surely existed, the 
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Douglas were already engaged in head-to-head competition with their L1011 
and DC-10. The low prices of these two aircraft could make them competitive 
even in the shorter-range market segment of the A300. It became clear that 
Airbus had to supply a complete family of aircraft in order to stay in the market 
in the long run. This also meant a new commitment by the participating gov- 
ernments to finance new types of aircraft, since the A300 and later the A310 
were not even close to their break-even points. 
The political decision in the 1960s to support a European civil aircraft indus- 
try by  subsidizing the development of  one new aircraft, the A300, has over 
time turned into the need to subsidize the market entry of  a producer  of  a 
complete family of aircraft. Subsidies and guarantees are given today for the 
development and launch of the A330 and the A340, but this is not necessarily 
the last step. Airbus has not yet internalized learning and scale effects in the 
same way as the established producers. The cost disadvantage of later market 
entry still exists. Airbus competes in market segments in which Boeing has 
already realized large learning effects and is able to produce at lower mar- 
ginal cost. 
Such a situation invites governments not only to support market entry but to 
subsidize the domestic firm in order to capture rents from the foreign firm. 
Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown that in a Cournot-Nash game subsid- 
ies paid by one government to its domestic producer who is selling its products 
in a third country increases profits and welfare. Can Europe gain by  not only 
supporting market entry but also subsidizing the production  of  its domestic 
producer? In the past such subsidies have not been paid in significant amounts, 
but recently, at least by the German government, considerable price support 
has been given. This development and the impact of potential retaliation by the 
American government will be included in the simulation exercises. 
5.3  The Model 
For the purposes of this paper the political decision to support market entry 
is taken as given. Up to now this support has taken the form of financing the 
launch investment. Such fixed-cost subsidies do not affect the capacity deci- 
sions of  the producers. Government support, therefore, only makes credible 
that the entrant will stay in the market even if entry is not profitable over the 
planning horizon. Entry-deterring pricing strategies by the incumbent producer 
are therefore not rational. With entry “exogenously” given, the game amounts 
to a Cournot-Nash game in capacity over the planning horizon. The possibility 
that European governments will pay  and may already have paid production 
subsidies is taken up later. Past production  subsidies and marketing aid are 
small compared to the subsidization of the launch investment (Coopers & Ly- 
brand 1988). The amount of production subsidies to be paid in the future is 
unknown, since these subsides are made dependent on exchange rate develop- 
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The short-run price game naturally can not be empirically investigated, since 
it depends on the actual development of demand in the future. Historical ex- 
amples show that aircraft prices fluctuate with demand; in  1979-83  rebates of 
up to 20 percent were not uncommon, according to airline officials. Apart from 
such demand fluctuations, real aircraft prices tend to remain constant over a 
product cycle. Our focus will be exclusively on the capacity game played be- 
tween two producers, which one could imagine as being Airbus Industrie and 
Boeing. McDonnell Douglas is left out of the model, since it has not developed 
a really new aircraft and seems to function more as a competitive fringe. Until 
the Pentagon issued a large order for military tanker aircraft recently, there had 
been doubts whether McDonnell Douglas would stay in the civil market at all. 
The model  represents a stylized picture  of  the  industry. In particular the 
production network of  a large number of subcontractors is ignored. The pro- 
ducers are modeled as decision units and production units. This approach im- 
plicitly  assumes that subcontractors have production technologies similar to 
those of the main firm, i.e., that they experience similar learning effects. An 
alternative model would only investigate the value added inside the two main 
producers and assume that intermediate products are bought from a competi- 
tive market, a less realistic assumption. 
5.3.1  Supply Decision 
Since an important part  of the economies  of  scale of  aircraft production 
are incorporated in the learning of the work force over time, a producer must 
essentially decide what the production capacity for a particular aircraft will be. 
In this model, entry times are treated as exogenous and correspond to the his- 
tory of launches and the announced launch dates for the A330 and A340. At 
the beginning of the model’s planning period each producer has to determine 
the capacity for every type of aircraft, whereby the cost function at that time is 
determined by the learning effect which has been accumulated in the past. This 
is done by  choosing the rate of production for each aircraft. Profit maximiza- 
tion then requires balancing between large production rates with lower costs 
and sufficiently high prices which require low production rates. 
In reality this will be a sequential decision with updates as time goes on and 
external parameters such as demand change. Nevertheless, capacity decisions 
do have a long-run  character even if  they are not made once and for all. A 
producer i therefore faces for a given capacity a flow of production y,,. The 
cumulative production xlT  at time T is then 
Capacity choice is then equivalent to the choice of x,~ 
Each producer has a cost function in terms of cumulated output which incor- 
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of this model, the CES cost function proposed by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 
(1982) is chosen. It can incorporate all the desired features. Dropping the time 
subscripts, the cost of producing k = 1, . . . ,m products for producer i is 
where F,h  is the fixed cost for product k; a,,,  Ptk,  0, > 0, for all i,  k; xz  = (xzl, 
It is assumed that both producers have the same cost function, i.e., that they 
are equally efficient. Since the incumbent has already realized learning effects 
he may be on a lower part of his learning curve thus having lower marginal 
cost.  The  multiproduct  cost  function  C,(x,) has  the  parameter  restric- 
tion 0 <08 < 1, for all i, if there are economies of scope in the production of 
x. In  the one-product case, the cost function reduces to the classic learning 
curve 
. . . ,  x,,,  . . .  1 xJ. 
(3) 
with learning elasticity 
(4)  = pe - 1. 
5.3.2  Aircraft Demand 
All producers face the same expected inverse demand function for aircraft 
over the time horizon  7: 
(5)  PA  =  '-k)? 
where 
* 
xA  = c  x,, and 
i=  I 
-k  = (1,.  . . ,k-l,k+l,  . 
Each firm produces in each market  segment an identical product which is 
subject to cross-price effects from other market segments. For the model simu- 
lation, a linear demand representation was chosen: 
t=  I  k= 1 
where bh  and d, are the demand parameters. 
5.3.3  Equilibrium 
The optimal capacity choice of the two producers, i =  A,& is found as the 
solution of  a Cournot-Nash game with cumulated  output x,, as the strategic 
variables. The reaction functions have the familiar form. The optimal strategy 
of producer  i, (i,,,  . . . ,iJ,  is given by the m first-order conditions: 110  Gernot Klepper 
where ek  is price  elasticity  of demand for product  k. The pair (iA,i,)  with 
2, = (i,,,  . . . ,iJ,  i =  A,& is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies equation (7) for 
all i =A,& and k = (1,. . . ,m). 
5.4  Calibration 
The effects of market entry cannot be empirically investigated with histori- 
cal data since Airbus is only now in the process of becoming a producer of a 
complete family of aircraft and none of its products have reached the end of a 
product cycle. The approach taken here relies  on the history of  Airbus and 
Boeing production up to  1986 and then uses demand forecasts by  the large 
producers up to the year 2006 as an empirical basis for the calibration of the 
model. This time period covers a complete product cycle for practically all 
aircraft types modeled here. The Airbus A330 and A340 are the exceptions, 
because they will not enter the market before  1992. Therefore demand fore- 
casts for the long-range market will not be an entirely adequate description of 
the demand over the product cycle for these two aircraft types. 
Demand forecasts by Boeing were available for the period 1987-2000 (Boe- 
ing  Company  1987), by  McDonnell  Douglas  for  1987-2001  (McDonnell 
Douglas  1987),  and  by  Airbus  for  1987-2006  (Airbus  Industrie  1987). 
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing forecast an overall demand for about 5,700 
large transport aircraft, which if projected to 2006 would predict demand to be 
about 8,100 aircraft. The Airbus forecast is more optimistic in predicting a 
total market for 9,797 airplanes. Although  all three producers operate with 
differently defined market segments, thus making comparisons difficult, the 
main difference can be attributed to a much larger Airbus prediction for the 
market for short- to medium-range wide-body aircraft. In light of recent expe- 
rience with airport congestion, this trend toward larger aircraft seems realistic. 
For the calibration  of  the model, three  market  segments were defined: a 
market for short- to medium-range narrow-body aircraft (S), one for short to 
medium-range wide-body aircraft (M), and one for long-range wide-body air- 
craft (L). For segment S the more conservative estimate of demand was used, 
mainly since McDonnell Douglas’s MD80s compete in this segment but are 
not explicitly modeled and because of the recent trend toward larger aircraft. 
The Airbus estimate of about 3,200 aircraft for segment M was adopted. The 
1,750 aircraft estimate adopted for segment L is closer to the projected Boeing 
estimate than to the Airbus and McDonnell Douglas forecasts. Since the A340 
as a competitor for the Boeing 747 in market segment L will not enter service 111  Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry 
before 1993, this is a conservative estimate if the market over the whole prod- 
uct cycle is the basis for capacity decisions. In summary, the three market seg- 
ments are calibrated to the following benchmarks: 
xs  = 3,500, x,  = 3,200, and x,  = 1,750. 
Listed market prices do not exist for large transport aircraft. Because differ- 
ent customers get different rebates, varied specifications of airplanes, and dif- 
ferent arrangements concerning training, spare parts, and maintenance, price 
documentation is difficult. The prices used  here are average prices derived 
from listed contracts (Znteruviu,  current issues) and interviews. They are mod- 
eled in constant prices and calibrated to the following approximate bench- 
marks: 
P, = 27, P,  = 62, and P, = 100. 
Technological characteristics are the launch investment which is taken as a 
fixed cost. For  aircraft launched before 1975 an estimate of  $3 billion was 
taken (U.S. Department of Commerce 1986). Any later aircraft was assumed 
to have a launch cost of $4 billion (Economist 1988). Learning effects are gen- 
erally believed to be strong. A learning elasticity of 0.2 is widely accepted as 
the correct benchmark for decreases in marginal cost. In the present model 
with output in the range of 1,000 to 3,000, one can compute directly the contri- 
butions of fixed cost and learning to the economies of  scale. It turns out that 
launch investment accounts for only about 10 percent of the overall economies 
of scale. 
Aircraft producers do not reveal marginal costs and synergy effects among 
the production of  different types of  aircraft. Airbus officials, however, claim 
that Airbus Industrie has reached the same level of efficiency as its American 
competitors. Since no other verifiable information is available, it is assumed 
that each producer has the same cost of producing the first airplane. 
However marginal cost for different producers may  differ widely at some 
point in time, since their aircraft were launched at different times. Suppose two 
producers have the same constant production rate and the same cost function 
but started production at different times. The difference in marginal cost at a 
particular date is then given by  the distance between the two marginal cost 
curves. This difference becomes smaller the larger cumulative production is. 
Because of  the relatively small number of  aircraft produced, this difference 
is of particular importance in the aircraft industry. For the model calibration, 
accumulated production of  Boeing types 737, 757, 767, and 747 and Airbus 
types A300 and A310 in each market segment up to  1987 entered the cost 
function as already acquired learning effects. 
Since demand for transport aircraft is derived demand, the shape of the de- 
mand curve depends on the elasticity of  demand for air transport, which is 
relatively low due to the absence of substitutes, and on the technology of pro- 
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seems to lie somewhere between -  1.5 (Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982) 
and  -2.85  (commercial US. domestic passenger  air  service; Baldwin  and 
Krugman  1988). The Baldwin  and Krugman estimate is based on  a market 
with  larger  cross-price  elasticities.  Therefore the  ‘‘true’’ price  elasticity  for 
world air transport will most likely be closer to the Kravis et al. estimate. On 
the other hand, it is a well-known observation that estimated short-run elasticit- 
ies are considerably smaller than their long-run counterparts. For large airlines 
the cost share of aircraft amounts to at most 20 percent of total operating cost, 
and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  aircraft  and  other  inputs  is low. 
Therefore the price elasticity of  demand for aircraft in general will be rather 
small, most likely below one. 
This finding does not fit the assumed Cournot-Nash framework of a capacity 
game, since it requires a much larger elasticity in order to attain an equilib- 
rium. An alternative at this point would be to give up the notion of a capacity 
game and to look for different  models that might more adequately  describe 
competition  in the aircraft  industry without  violating estimated  parameters. 
Krugman and Brainard (1988) have tried alternative approaches but have not 
yet found a satisfying alternative to the capacity game. The other possibility is 
to assume the capacity game to be the correct model and to determine demand 
elasticities in the calibration procedure. This, of  course, leads to elasticities 
that are higher than those derived from empirical estimates. 
In this paper, the latter choice was taken, i.e., elasticities are treated as en- 
dogenous in this model. Assuming  demand elasticities to be endogenous  re- 
quires us to treat profit rates as exogenous, which follows necessarily from the 
first-order condition (eq. 7). which states that the price-cost markup is a func- 
tion of market shares and demand elasticities, i.e., that 
Hence one is left with another unobservable  variable. The choice of a rate of 
profit to calibrate the benchmark must therefore remain arbitrary. Several rates 
of profit (defined as the ratio of profit to revenue) have been tried in order to 
assess the robustness of the model with respect to this parameter. The lowest 
number for which an equilibrium could be established  was 5.2 percent. The 
simulations were then run for different rates of profit between 5.2 and 7 per- 
cent.  The resulting welfare  effects remain  stable in relative  terms, whereas 
their absolute size changes slightly.* The simulations presented here are based 
on a rate of return of  5.5 percent, which represents the lowest price elasticity 
compatible with  a robust  model.  The resulting  direct price  elasticities  are 
larger than -2  and in the long-range market close to -  I. Since the model has 
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a linear demand system, the price elasticities vary  slightly with the different 
simulations. 
The parameter value for the degree of economies of scope had to be chosen 
arbitrarily. Its value of  8 = .97 can be interpreted as follows: the introduction 
of  a new generic aircraft, when the firm has already experienced the learning 
effects of  about 1,000 older and different aircraft, reduces marginal cost by 
some 30 percent compared to the situation where it produces its very first air- 
plane as, e.g., in the case of the A300. For this model, in which both producers 
supply an aircraft in each size category, the impact of different degrees of econ- 
omies of scope is marginal since the calibration procedure compensates these 
different degrees by adjusting the constant term of the learning curve. Econo- 
mies of scope only become important if one firm produces only two types of 
aircraft. It would then be unable to compete with a full-scale supplier. 
On the demand side, poor data availability would have required us to model 
demand for each type of aircraft independently by setting cross-price elasticit- 
ies to zero. This was felt to be unrealistic for two reasons: first, there are obvi- 
ous opportunities  for airlines  to substitute  aircraft,  though  at  considerable 
costs; second, without positive cross-price elasticities the price-cost  markup 
for long-range aircraft would be much higher than even European supporters 
of the Airbus project would claim. The range of elasticities yielding reasonable 
equilibria was very narrow and confined to values below 0.2. Therefore a zero 
cross-price elasticity between small- to medium-range narrow-bodied (S) and 
long-range aircraft (L) was chosen. The elasticity between small- to medium- 
range narrow-bodied (S) and wide-bodied (M) as well as that between wide- 
bodied (M) and long-range (L) was set to 0.1. 
The calibration proceeded then in the following steps. First, the remaining 
demand parameters and the cost parameters were derived under the assumption 
of  two producers with identical technology and both on the same points of 
their learning curves; that is, the production prior to 1987 for each producer 
was taken to be the average of the Airbus and Boeing production in table 5.1. 
The benchmarks for total number of aircraft sold over the planning period and 
for aircraft prices are those given above. The resulting equilibrium has the pro- 
ducers equally sharing the total market. In the second step, the learning effects 
which each producer has already acquired before  1987 in the production of 
Table 5.1  Production up to 1987 
Market Segment 
S  M  L 
Airbus  0  288  0 
Boeing  1,070  I49  609 
Source: Interavia (current issues). 114  Gernot Klepper 
each aircraft type were used to determine the magnitude of the marginal cost 
function at the beginning of the planning  period. For example, Boeing had 
already produced 1,070 aircraft in market segment S (see table 5.1); hence the 
marginal cost of the first aircraft produced in the planning period is derived by 
computing those costs using the calibrated parameters from the first step and 
taking the difference between Boeing's  actual production and the average of 
the first step. The allocation derived through this procedure then predicts mar- 
ket shares and cost differences for the two producers; it will be referred to as 
the base-case calibration. 
5.4.1  Base-case Results 
The results of the base-case calibration are summarized in table 5.2. Under 
the assumption of equal technologies for both producers, output in the Nash 
equilibrium variers due to the cost advantages of previous learning. In market 
segment S, Boeing's marginal cost advantage is 23 percent, resulting in a mar- 
ket share of 31 percent for Airbus and leaving 69 percent for Boeing. In seg- 
ment M, where Airbus has a slight advantage through the early launch of the 
A300, a marginal cost advantage of 6 percent translates into a 53  percent mar- 
ket share. Similarly for segment L, with cost differentials of 15 percent, market 
shares are 45 percent for Airbus and 55 percent for Boeing. 
The expected profitability of the activities of the two producers can be com- 
puted  either over the complete product cycle of  their products, by including 
the sales prior to the start of the time horizon of the calibration, or for the time 
horizon of the calibration and the period before, separately. Table 5.3 presents 
all three computations. For simplicity the prices of aircraft prior to the calibra- 
tion  period  are  set  equal to the  calibrated  prices.  This  underestimates  the 
profitability of Boeing in a period where it had a monopoly in the long-range 
market with its 747 and also sold aircraft which are not counted here such as 
the 727. 
The summary in table 5.3 shows how the late entry of Airbus affects profit- 
ability and production well into the next century Airbus will have almost bro- 
Table 5.2  Market for Large Transport Aircraft? 1987-2006  (base-case 
calibration) 
~  ______~ 
Market Segment 
S  M  L 
Airbus  Boeing  Airbus  Boeing  Airbus  Boeing 
output  1,103  2,430  1,124  1.528  796  967 
Market share (%)  31  69  53  47  45  55 
Marginal cost  23.7  18.9  51.0  52.3  63.1  54.9 
Price  21.1  62.5  101.0 
"or  parameters, see Klepper (1990, table Al). 115  Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry 
Table 5.3  Revenues, Costs, and Profits 
Airbus  Boeing 












18.0  100.5 
218.8  260.6 
236.8  361.1 
-  14.7  -1.6 
11.9  53.0 
-2.8  45.4 
-82.0  -7.6 
5.4  20.3 
-1.2  12.6 
ken even by the end of our time horizon, but Boeing will have a rate of return 
of 12.6 percent. For the period 1987-2006  both Airbus and Boeing are profit- 
able, if the start-up investment had high learning cost of the period to 1987 are 
not counted. These numbers give a rough indication of the cost disadvantage 
of  Airbus in the 30 years after its market entry. At the end of this period, the 
comparison is not entirely correct, since by that time in market segments S and 
L Boeing will supply aircraft types which are at the end of their product cycles, 
whereas Airbus will have aircraft in the S and L segments which are still rela- 
tively new. Therefore Boeing will, during the time under investigation,  face 
development costs for a new generation of aircraft. 
5.5  Welfare 
5.5.1  Effects of Airbus Market Entry 
In order to assess the welfare consequences of government-supported mar- 
ket entry, a fictitious market structure without this entry has to be used as a 
reference allocation. One can imagine two scenarios which could have become 
reality after 1970. If, on one hand, concentration in the aircraft industry had 
continued  in the  1970s as it had in the decades before and Airbus had not 
entered the market, Boeing might have eventually become a monopoly. If, on 
the other hand, the market were large enough for two or more producers and 
Lockheed or McDonnell Douglas were efficient producers, a duopoly such as 
the current situation might have emerged. The difference would be that the 
market would have two established producers instead of one new entrant and 
one incumbent. Both alternatives are simulated as benchmarks for the effects 
of alternative market structures. 
Monopoly  is simulated by  leaving all parameters unchanged,  except that 
there is only one producer, Boeing. Accumulated output in the monopoly situa- 116  Gernot Klepper 
tion is slightly  smaller but not by  a large amount, except in the long-range 
market segment, where the monopoly supplies almost 20 percent fewer air- 
craft. Prices rise between 3 percent and 16 percent. Profits to the monopolist 
almost triple so that the rate of profit over the whole product cycle increases 
from 12.5 percent in the base case to 27 percent in the monopoly case. 
The second alternative is a duopoly with established producers of equal ef- 
ficiency and thus on the same points of their learning curves. Consequently, 
they will share the market equally. This situation is simulated by assuming that 
at the beginning of the calibration period the same number of aircraft in each 
market segment have already been produced as in the base case. But this time 
the production has been shared equally by both producers. Only in the short- 
range narrow-body market does the overall output deviate significantly from 
the base case. This is induced by the large learning effects incorporated in the 
1,070 aircraft produced prior to 1987 in the base case. Otherwise there is little 
deviation in the allocation from the base case. 
Whereas the regional distribution of producer surplus is easy to determine, 
consumer  surplus has to be  approximated  by  the distribution  of  air traffic. 
Forecasted regional market shares (Airbus Industrie  1987) were used to dis- 
tribute  consumer welfare among Europe,  the United  States, and the rest of 
the world. 
Table 5.4 summarizes the welfare effects of Airbus market entry when it is 
compared to a monopoly and when  compared to a duopoly. If  a monopoly 
were the alternative market structure, the market entry of Airbus could be con- 
sidered  successful from a consumer’s point of  view, but  the overall welfare 
impact is negative. A consumer surplus gain of $36.8 billion is dominated by 
the producer surplus loss of  $110.4 billion, most of which is the monopoly 
profit of Boeing (table 5.4). The regional distribution reveals welfare gains to 
Europe and the rest of the world, whereas in North America, i.e., the United 
States, consumers gain and producers lose. 
The European producer surplus figures in table 5.4 do not include govern- 
Table 5.4  Distribution of Welfare Effects of Government-supported Market 
Entry (million 1986 $ U.S.) 
Producer Surplus  Consumer Surplus  Total 
Relative to monopoly 
Europe 
North America  - 
Rest of  world 
Total 
Relative to duopoly 
Europe 
North America 
















-  1,405 
-958 
-  3,268 
7,7  18 
-94.95  I 
13,620 
-  73,613 
-3,73  I 
10,569 
-958 
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ment subsidies. If indeed the projected $20 billion subsidies were paid by Eu- 
ropean governments  and financed by European  taxpayers, there would be a 
redistribution of consumer and producer surplus. Market entry would cost Eu- 
ropean consumers roughly $10 billion, but total welfare to Europe would re- 
main unchanged. Taking these subsidies into account, government-supported 
market entry by Airbus as an antimonopoly policy-as  has been claimed by 
European governments-did  indeed help consumers, but only those outside 
Europe. 
If the market entry of Airbus is compared to the hypothetical situation of a 
duopoly with equal, mature producers, a surprising welfare effect emerges. 
Overall welfare in the base case is $5.9 billion  higher than in the reference 
situation. Consumers lose in all regions, but these losses are smaller than the 
gain in producer rents. Boeing has higher profits in the base case than do the 
two American producers in the hypothetical duopoly. Two forces, scale and 
scope effects and the competitive effect, can explain this result.  Because of 
increasing returns to scale, the social optimum is one producer with marginal- 
cost pricing and large output and, consequently,  lower average and marginal 
cost. The simulated duopoly situation forces both producers up their average 
cost curves. 
In the base case, Boeing of course has lower and Airbus higher marginal 
cost than in the reference situation. But on average both  producers together 
produce at lower average and marginal cost in the base case. This advantage 
does not show up in prices, it goes to Boeing in the form of profits. Therefore, 
the market entry of Airbus has forced Boeing into more competitive behavior 
than was necessary  in a Boeing monopoly, but since Airbus is only a small 
producer, the scale effects of Boeing with its projected market share of around 
60 percent are strong enough to compensate for the high-cost production of 
Airbus. 
The simulations and the two alternative  welfare comparisons in table 5.4 
show  that  there  is  a  conflict  between  competition  effects-indirectly 
consumer-welfare and scale effects, i.e., overall welfare effects. Although the 
market is simulated to sustain two equal producers, welfare is larger in a mo- 
nopoly situation, and even an inefficient  second producer with small market 
shares is better than the hypothetical duopoly. This suggests that, in the market 
for large transport  aircraft, scale and scope effects are strong enough to out- 
weigh the output-reducing effects of increasing market power and-in  the ex- 
treme-of  a monopoly. If  the model represents the replacement of  an estab- 
lished  American  producer  by  a  European  entrant,  Airbus,  the  regional 
distribution of welfare changes looks ironic. Only North America gains from 
the Airbus market entry. 
5.5.2  Production Subsidies 
Up to now simulations of industrial policy have focused only on supporting 
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cumbent's pricing policy. Entry-detemng pricing strategies are not rational, if 
the commitment of European governments is credible as it was in the case of 
Airbus. These subsidies do not, however, influence the capacity game between 
the two producers. This game can be influenced only if  output decisions are 
influenced by production or price subsidies. It has been shown by Brander and 
Spencer (1985) that the optimal export subsidy rate is that which moves the 
reaction function of the subsidized firm to the point that would have been cho- 
sen by the firm if it were in a Stackelberg-leader position. Since in the case of 
aircraft, production in general is subsidized and there is domestic consumption, 
the optimal subsidy is higher than a subsidy on exports alone. 
In order to determine the optimal subsidy for Airbus, alternative  subsidy 
rates have been simulated. It was assumed that only those aircraft types are 
subsidized in which Boeing has an advantage in terms of learning effects, i.e., 
short- to medium-range narrow-body  and long-range aircraft. The Cournot- 
Nash game is played in the same fashion and parameter values are unchanged. 
Figure 5.2 summarizes the output effects of  the increasing subsidization of 
Airbus. Output is measured in total number of aircraft produced. Total output 
increases by only 6.6 percent if Airbus is subsidized with a 20 percent subsidy 
on price. Although only aircraft in two market segments are subsidized, Airbus 
increases its market share in all three segments: from 3  1 to 60 percent in the 
short- to medium-range, from 53 to 61 percent  in the medium-range  wide- 
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body and from 45 to 53 percent in the long-range market. Figure 5.3 summa- 
rizes the welfare effects of increased subsidization. Profits increase faster than 
subsidies, which does not come as a surprise since Airbus realizes learning 
effects through larger production, but since Boeing can sell fewer aircraft, 
prices fall only slightly. Subsidization, in a sense, induces a transfer of learning 
effects from Boeing to Airbus, leaving consumers relatively unaffected. Euro- 
pean consumer surplus net of subsidy payments decreases, e.g., from $33 bil- 
lion to $5.5 billion in the case of a 20 percent subsidy. 
The effect on American and rest-of-the-world consumers and producers is 
essentially the opposite. There are small gains in consumer surplus due to a 
slight fall in prices both in the United States and the rest of the world. Boeing’s 
loss in profits is larger than Airbus’s profit increases net of subsidy payments. 
World welfare decreases by  less than 1 percent. 
Production subsidies have been varied over a large range, but there is no 
profit- or welfare-maximizing subsidy as in Brander and Spencer (1985). For 
subsidies higher than 22 percent no equilibrium can be simulated. The reason 
for this result is essentially the same as for the welfare effects of the market 
entry of  Airbus in the previous section. Airbus profits net of  subsidies as a 
function of subsidy rates are S-shaped, as shown in figure 5.4, with an inflec- 
tion point around a subsidy rate of  10 percent. This, incidentally, is also the 
minimum of world welfare (fig. 5.4),  and at this subsidy rate Airbus and Boe- 
ing have approximately equal market shares. The previous section showed that 120  Gernot Klepper 
World 
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Fig. 5.4  Welfare effects of Airbus subsidies 
a monopoly  is in overall welfare terms superior to the current situation  and 
even to a duopoly of  two identical producers. Welfare effects of production 
subsidies follow the same logic. Increased subsidization of Airbus first leads 
to an equalization of market shares and therefore to higher unit cost on average. 
Hence, world welfare is reduced and the cost advantage of  Boeing becomes 
smaller. Only when subsidization increases beyond 10 percent, does the differ- 
ence in marginal cost become large enough to ensure that profits increase at a 
faster rate. 
From both a pure profit-transfer  perspective and a European welfare per- 
spective, it would be advantageous to subsidize the domestic firm to such a 
degree that foreign competitors are driven out of  the market. This particular 
simulation result for the aircraft industry  depends predominantly  on the as- 
sumed existence of large economies of scale and barriers to entry. Even though 
the market is large enough to support two firms-at  least in the calibration of 
this model-a  monopoly is superior to a duopoly in terms of world welfare. 
This result will most likely be true for industries with similar degrees of econo- 
mies of scale. In  that sense, there is a strong incentive to support domestic 
industry. Although in the present model Airbus is a producer with higher cost, 
it is advantageous to support the inefficient firm. These arguments, of course, 121  Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry 
Table 5.5  Market Structures with Optimal Production Subsidies 
United StatesBoeing 
European Community/ 
Airbus  Subsidize  Do not subsidize 
Subsidize  ?  Boeing monopoly 
Do not subsidize  Airbus monopoly  duopoly (status quo) 
remain valid only as long as retaliation from foreign governments is not con- 
sidered. 
5.5.3  Retaliation 
The same logic according to which it is advantageous to subsidize Airbus 
applies, of course, to subsidizing Boeing, even more so since Boeing has lower 
unit cost because of learning effects from prior production. Both governments 
therefore have an incentive to subsidize their respective industries. The interac- 
tion of possible outcomes is shown in table 5.5.3  Whether any government has 
a dominant strategy depends on the outcome of subsidization with retaliation. 
In Brander and Spencer (1985) a Nash equilibrium in export subsidies ex- 
ists.  It  is a prisoner’s dilemma,  since both  countries could be  better  off  by 
jointly reducing subsidy levels but would be worse off by unilaterally reducing 
subsidies. In the simulation model of this paper, an optimal unilateral subsidy 
level is not compatible with the existence of two firms. The same is true for 
retaliation against any subsidy that is low enough to allow both firms to stay in 
the market. Retaliatory subsidy rates also increase the welfare of the retaliating 
country up to the point where the foreign firm  is driven out of the market. 
There is no Nash-duopoly equilibrium in government subsidies in this model, 
so if both governments subsidize, the question is which producer will survive. 
Figure 5.5 shows the effects of subsidies on production. The curve labeled 
“Airbus subsidy effects” shows the different production equilibria traced out 
for different levels of unilateral production  subsidy rates of Airbus by Euro- 
pean governments, for a zero production subsidy rate to Boeing. As the Euro- 
pean subsidy rate rises from 0 to 20 percent, Boeing output falls from nearly 
5,000 to under 4,000, while Airbus output rises from around 3,500 to almost 
5,500.  The curve labeled “Boeing subsidy effects” shows the effects of varying 
the Boeing production subsidy rate from 0 to 3 percent, given an Airbus sub- 
sidy, which costs $14 billion; a 3 percent subsidy to Boeing, which will cost 
about $4 billion, will restore Boeing’s output to presubsidy levels and therefore 
restore all of Boeing’s learning advantages. 
Airbus gains $10 billion of profits in comparison with the no-subsidy equi- 
3. It is important to note that this comparison excludes all external economic or political costs 
of  such governmental action. 122  Gernot Klepper 
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Fig. 5.5  Production effects of subsidies 
Nofe:  Numbers in parentheses denote subsidy rates for Airbus and Boeing, respectively. 
librium, but the net loss to Europe is $4 billion. Faced with the threat of  a 
Boeing subsidy, Europe does better to close Airbus down. Faced with the pos- 
sibility of an Airbus production subsidy, the American government can credi- 
bly threaten to impose the relatively modest Boeing production subsidy that 
will make it optimal for Europe not to produce Airbus aircraft. 
5.6  Conclusion 
In this paper the allocation and welfare effects of industrial policy measures 
in an industry with strong economies of scale and high entry barriers have been 
investigated. Production of large transport aircraft has often been considered a 
prime candidate for the realization, similar to theoretical predictions, of poten- 
tial welfare gains through industrial and trade policy measures. A stylized sim- 
ulation model of competition in the aircraft industry is developed, focusing on 
two distinct industrial policy measures: first, European governmental support 
of the entry of Airbus Industrie in the market for large transport aircraft and, 
second, the potential impact of production subsidies, taking into consideration 
unilateral action as well as possible retaliation. 
The welfare effects of government-supported market entry in the aircraft 
industry are somewhat difficult to interpret, because learning effects and econ- 123  Industrial Policy in the Transport Aircraft Industry 
omies of scope are so important that a monopoly would maximize world wel- 
fare-not  considering distributional aspects. At the same time, the market is 
large enough to support two producers. It is also ambiguous which hypotheti- 
cal  situation  the  government-supported  market  entry  of  Airbus  Industrie 
should be compared to. 
When Airbus’s entry is compared  to a Boeing monopoly, overall welfare 
decreases. This is so because monopoly profits disappear, and, while consum- 
ers gain in all regions, they do so by less than the profit loss. The reason for 
this result is that scale and scope effects of producing large transport aircraft 
are strong enough to outweigh the output-reducing effects of a Boeing monop- 
oly. From the viewpoint of  European governments, Airbus’s market entry as 
an “antimonopoly” policy was not successful. Only consumers in the rest of 
the world will gain. The negative welfare change is due to Airbus’s inefficient 
scale of production relative to Boeing’s and due to the high subsidies. 
The negative welfare effects of  Airbus’s entry are even more pronounced 
when compared to a situation with two established American producers. Air- 
bus’s high-cost production yields higher welfare than a duopoly with two iden- 
tical firms, because the scale effects of the large producer in the unequal situa- 
tion dominate the competitive effects. Since consumers in all regions lose from 
Airbus’s entry and the American producer, Boeing, gains more than American 
consumers lose, the market entry of Airbus yields a positive welfare change 
only in North America. 
The basic logic behind these results is not peculiar to the aircraft industry. 
If economies of scale are large enough, a market structure with a small number 
of firms can emerge which is, in welfare terms, inferior to a monopoly. Because 
two or more firms can profitably stay in the market, economies of scale remain 
unexhausted  and-at  the same time-are  larger than the losses in consumer 
surplus from monopoly pricing. In asymmetric situations-for  example, one 
large and one small firm-scale  effects also come into play.  In  a symmetric 
equilibrium, economies of scale are exploited to the least extent. The more 
asymmetric the equilibrium, the more consumers can gain from the realized 
economies of scale of the large producers and still have the more competitive 
output policy. This logic is present in the analysis of production subsidies as 
well. 
Airbus, with a market share of about 30 percent, is the smaller firm. Unilat- 
eral subsidization of Airbus will reduce world welfare because of the scale 
effect just mentioned. The welfare minimum is indeed reached when both pro- 
ducers have approximately equal market shares. Beyond that point, it increases 
until the other producer leaves the market. Because overall welfare in a monop- 
oly dominates oligopolistic industry structures and because it is usually new- 
comers and relatively small industries that are supported, the optimal subsidy 
is one which drives the other firm from the market, i.e., the Stackelberg-leader 
point is in  a region  of  the other firm’s reaction  function  in  which it incurs 
losses. 124  Gernot Klepper 
With subsidization amounting to a monopolization of the market, retaliation 
is the natural consequence. The simulations  show that  the incumbent  large 
firm, through small retaliatory subsidies, can easily be brought into a position 
where support by the foreign government can be neutralized. The ability and 
willingness to retaliate should therefore effectively threaten any desire to im- 
prove the market position of a small firm by subsidizing it. 
This simulation study had to be based on extremely few observable parame- 
ters so that a number of educated guesses were necessary in order to attain the 
necessary  degrees  of  freedom for calibration. The most crucial point  is the 
demand  elasticity  which-compared  to  empirical  predictions-must  be 
higher for securing the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. If one takes 
this restriction as given, the scnsitivity analysis of alternative values showed 
that there is only a very narrow range of elasticities for which equilibria exist 
and for which reasonable results of the calibration come out. Within this range, 
the welfare results of the simulation study remain robust, if not in their abso- 
lute value then in their distributional consequences. Within this Cournot-Nash 
capacity game framework, one can hardly come up with different welfare re- 
sults. It remains to be explored, however, whether one can find a theoretical 
model which represents a reasonable capacity game and at the same time fits 
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The commercial aircraft industry presents a highly seductive case study in stra- 
tegic trade policy. As one of the most concentrated industries in the world it is 
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a clear example of a market shaped by  “small numbers of large strategically 
self-conscious agents (firms and governments), [rather than] by large numbers 
of small agents competing at arm’s length” (Richardson 1989, 1.1). In addition, 
the cast of  characters has been stable (only one firm has exited and one firm 
has entered in the last 30 years), production is geographically concentrated, 
and product cycles are long. Despite these characteristics, researcher after re- 
searcher has been frustrated in his or her modeling attempts. 
Formal modeling efforts have stalled and left us with a paucity of specific 
advice to offer policymakers. Policymakers, however, must  move  with the 
course of events and have had to deal with flare-ups in the GATT over Airbus 
subsidies, potential joint ventures between U.S. and European firms, and, in- 
triguingly, a new partnership between Boeing and a Japanese consortium of 
Fuji, Kawasaki, and Mitsubishi. What roadblocks did the researchers run into? 
What questions might be tackled to assist policymakers? 
Dixit and Kyle (1985) began the work on aircraft by  setting up a dynamic 
oligopoly model with both firms and governments as players. They did not 
attempt to inject any empirical data into their modeling effort, however, and 
more insight was gained into potential welfare effects than how competition 
would actually ensue. Baldwin and Krugman (1988) followed with a Spence 
(1981) type learning curve model (modified to include fixed costs) but de- 
prived the firms of the ability to act strategically (by having them assume the 
other firm’s whole stream of output as given). Through this work they devel- 
oped insights into the importance of consumer surplus in determining optimal 
policy and of dynamic economies of scale. They also discovered that they had 
limited the model unintentionally by neglecting a key  aspect of the product: 
commercial aircraft are extremely durable capital goods. Krugman and Brain- 
ard (1988) attempted to overcome this and other problems of modeling demand 
(such as expectations regarding future products, implicit contracting, and oli- 
gopsonistic demand) by  turning to a variant of  Baumol, Panzar, and Willig’s 
(1982) contestable markets approach. Rejecting the familiar models of compe- 
tition, they were unable to run the standard simulations. The Krugman and 
Brainard approach appears to hold further potential to be exploited despite the 
remaining technical difficulties. 
In the paper Klepper has presented here, he turns back to a track of Spence- 
style modeling he began in 1988. He focuses on economies of scale (both static 
and dynamic) and economies of scope as the key industry characteristics. De- 
spite his effort to set up a sophisticated framework in which the long-run quan- 
tity game serves as a restriction on the short-run price game, his results are 
unsatisfying. He finds that if demand turns out to be larger than expected, firms 
will produce at their capacity limit and choose prices which maximize profits. 
This does not seem to be a good description of the behavior observed in 1989 
when the three big producers held orders totaling an estimated $133 billion 
and yet margins in the industry were still thin. 
We  clearly need to push our models further, but in what directions? If  re- 128  Gernot Klepper 
searchers want to go on and enrich their models in ways that would increase 
their utility to policymakers, they might want to try and answer a number of 
questions, including: 
1. How should the objective function of government be represented? Should 
it be restricted to maximizing consumer plus producer surplus and partial equi- 
librium, or expanded to include (i) technological spillovers from R&D, includ- 
ing learning of engineers about production,  (ii) human resource development 
to encourage workers to invest in learning and to handle upswings in demand, 
(iii) national prestige (advertisement for technological capability), and (iv) na- 
tional security? 
2. How do we model governments? Should they be modeled as monolithic 
actors? Or should the United States be modeled as the executive branch and 
the Congress, for example, and the European Community as member govern- 
ments and the Commission? 
3. What is a subsidy? Is it building military planes first to create economies 
of scope for commercial aircraft? Building planes without contracts in hand 
and  absorbing  inventory  costs?  Covering  exchange  rate  risk?  Cross- 
subsidization from the military? Accumulated learning  from earlier  genera- 
tions? 
4. How do we model the buyers, the unions, or the engine suppliers? Do we 
give them market power or not? (I would argue that we should.) 
5. How do we deal with the aging stock problem? We  know we see old 
planes substituting for new planes when (i) fuel prices fall, (ii) capacity con- 
straints combined with strong demand drive prices up, (iii) manufacturers start 
quoting long delivery lags, or (iv) demand profiles change (for size and length 
of haul). 
6.  What are the defects of the GATT Civil Aircraft Agreement? Does it need 
to be amended? How should it be amended? The heat of  this long-standing 
international trade dispute varies by the state of industry. 
7. Can we model the potential of Japanese entry? 
This has been a long list of modeling questions but our modeling efforts to 
date have proved how difficult the competition  in even a simple industry can 
be to penetrate. Fortunately, we have several modeling paths available to us as 
we continue. 
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